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In this issue, Lomuscio and Penczek survey some of the recent work in verification of temporal-
epistemic logic via symbolic model checking, focussing on OBDD-based and SAT-based approaches
for epistemic logics built on discrete and real-time branching time temporal logics.
On this topic, I should mention the following paper, which compares several model checkers for
epistemic logics with a temporal component, using as a test case the Russian Cards problem:
H. P. van Ditmarsch, W. van der Hoek, R. van der Meyden, and J. Ruan. Model
checking Russian Cards. Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science, 149(2):105–
123, 2006.
The Russian Card problem is described here:
H. P. van Ditmarsch. The Russian Cards problem. Studia Logica, 75:31–62, 2003.
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1 Introduction
The study of epistemic logics, or logics for the representation of knowledge, has a long and successful
tradition in Logic, Computer Science, Economics and Philosophy. Its main motivational thrust is
the observation that knowledge of the principals (or agents) in an exchange is fundamental in the
1 c© A. Lomuscio and W. Penczek, 2007.
ACM SIGACT News 1 Vol. —, No. —
study not only of the information they have at their disposal, but also in the analysis of their
rational actions and, consequently, of the overall behaviour of the system. It is often remarked
that the first systematic attempts to develop modal formalisms for knowledge date back to the
sixties and seventies and in particular to the works of Hintikka [28] and Gettier [37]. The line of
work at the time focussed on the adequacy of particular principles, expressed as axioms of modal
logic, representing certain properties of knowledge in a rational setting. The standard framework
consisted of the propositional normal modal logic S5n [10] built on top of the propositional calculus
by considering the axioms
K : Ki(p→ q)→ Kip→ Kiq
T : Kip→ p
4 : Kip→ KiKip
5 : Kip→ Ki¬Kip,
together with usual normal rules of necessitation Nec : From ϕ infer Kiϕ and modus ponens. Since
then several other formalisms have been introduced accounting for weaker notions of knowledge as
well as subtly different mental notions such as belief, explicit knowledge and others.
While in the sixties soundness and completeness of these formalisms were shown, the standard
semantics considered was the one of plain Kripke models. These are models of the form M =
(W, {Ri}i∈A, V ), where W is a set of “possible worlds”, Ri ⊆ W ×W is a binary relation between
worlds expressing epistemic indistinguishably between them, and V :W → 2PV is an interpretation
function for a set of basic propositional variables PV . Indeed, much of the theory of modal logic has
been developed in this setting up to recent times. However, in the eighties and nineties attention
was given to finer grained semantics that accounted for the particular states of computation in a
system. In terms of epistemic logic the challenge was to develop semantics that accounted both to
the low-level models of (a-)synchronous actions and protocols, and that at the same time would
be amenable to simple yet intuitive notions of knowledge. The key basic semantical concept put
forward at the time satisfying these considerations was the one which became popular with the
name of interpreted system. Originally developed independently by Parikh and Ramanujam [50],
Halpern and Moses [26] and Rosenscheim [61] and later popularised by [22], the interpreted system
model offered a natural yet powerful formalism to represent the temporal evolution of a system as
well as the evolution of knowledge of the principals in the run. The development of this model
triggered a tremendous acceleration in the study of logics for knowledge with several results being
produced both in terms of axiomatisations with respect to several different classes of models of
agents (synchronous, asynchronous, perfect recall, no learning, etc.) as well as applications of these
to standard problems such as coordinated attack, communication, security, and others.
In this setting logic was most often seen as a formal reasoning tool. Attention was given to the
exploration of metaproperties of the various formalisms (such as their completeness, decidability,
and computational complexity), axiomatisations developed. Attempts were made to verify systems
automatically by exploring the relation Γ ⊢L ϕ, where ϕ is a specification for the system, L is the
axiomatised logic representing the system and Γ, a set of formulae expressing the initial conditions.
However, partly due to the inherent complexity of some of the epistemic formalisms, verification of
concrete systems via theorem proving for epistemic logics did not attract too much attention.
At the same time (the early nineties) the area of verification by model checking [17] began
acquiring considerable attention with a stream of results being produced for a variety of temporal
logics. The idea of switching attention from theorem proving to model checking became prominent
[27]. However, it was not before the very end of the nineties that similar ideas began becoming
ACM SIGACT News 2 Vol. —, No. —
applied to the verification of multi-agent systems via temporal-epistemic formalisms. The first
contribution in the area to our knowledge dates back to a paper by van der Meyden and Shilov
[47], where the complexity of model checking perfect recall semantics is analysed. After that
attention switched to the possible use of ad-hoc local propositions for translating the verification
of temporal-epistemic into plain temporal logic [29]. Following this there were studies on the
extension of bounded model checking algorithms [53] and binary-decision diagrams [60]. Several
other extensions and algorithms later appeared.
The aim of this paper is to survey some of the results by the authors in this area over the past
few years. The area has grown tremendously and it is impossible to provide a comprehensive yet
technical enough survey in a relatively compact article; some other approaches are discussed in
Section 6, but others, inevitably, are unfortunately left out. In particular here we only consider
approaches where knowledge is treated as a full-fledged modality interpreted on sets of global states
in possible executions and not as a simple predicate as other approaches have featured. Concretely,
the rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we present syntax and semantics of
the basic logic. In Section 3 we introduce and discuss an OBDD-based approach to verification
of temporal-epistemic logic. In Section 4 an alternative yet complementary approach based on
bounded and unbounded model checking is discussed. In Section 5 extensions to real-time are
summarised briefly. Related work is discussed in Section 6.
2 Syntax and Semantics
Many model checking approaches differ depending on the syntax supported as a specification lan-
guage for the properties to be verified by the model checker. We begin here with the basic temporal
branching time temporal-epistemic logic.
2.1 Syntax
Given a set of agents A = {1, . . . , n} and a set of propositional variables PV , we define the language
L of CTLK as the fusion between the branching time logic CTL and the epistemic logic S5n for n
modalities of knowledge Ki (i = 1, . . . , n) and group epistemic modalities EΓ, DΓ, and CΓ (Γ ⊆ A):
ϕ,ψ ::= p ∈ PV | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | Kiϕ | EΓϕ | DΓϕ | CΓϕ | AXϕ | AGϕ | A(ϕUψ)
In addition to the standard Boolean connectives the syntax above defines two fragments: an epis-
temic and a temporal one. The epistemic part includes formulas of the form Kiϕ representing
“agent i knows that ϕ”, EΓϕ standing for “everyone in group Γ knows that ϕ”, DΓϕ representing
“it is distributed knowledge in group Γ that ϕ is true”, CΓ formalising “it is common knowledge in
group Γ that ϕ”. We refer to [22] for a discussion of these concepts and examples. The temporal
fragment defines formulas of the form AXϕ meaning “in all possible paths at each possible next
step ϕ holds true”; AGϕ standing for “in all possible paths along ϕ is always true”; and A(ϕUψ)
representing “in all possible paths at some point ψ holds true and before then ϕ is true along the
path”.
Whenever Γ = A we will omit the subscript from the group modalities E, D, and C. As
customary we will also use “diamond modalities”, i.e., modalities dual to the ones defined. In
particular, for the temporal part we use EFϕ = ¬AG¬ϕ, EXϕ = ¬AX¬ϕ representing “there
exists a path where at some point ϕ is true” and “there exists a path in which at the next step ϕ
is true” respectively. We will also use the E(ϕUψ) with obvious meaning. For the epistemic part
ACM SIGACT News 3 Vol. —, No. —
we use overlines to indicate the epistemic diamonds; in particular we use Kiϕ as a shortcut for
¬Ki¬ϕ, meaning “agent i considers it possible that ϕ” and similarly for EΓ, DΓ, and CΓ.
Formulas including both temporal and epistemic modalities can represent expressive specifica-
tions in particular scenarios, e.g., the evolution of private and group knowledge over time, knowledge
about a changing environment as well as knowledge about other agents’ knowledge. We refer to
[22] for standard examples such as alternating bit protocol, attacking generals, message passing
systems, etc.
2.2 Interpreted systems semantics
In what follows the syntax of the specification language supported is interpreted on the multi-agent
semantics of interpreted systems [22]. Interpreted systems are a fine-grained semantics put forward
in [26] to represent temporal evolution and knowledge in multi-agent systems. Although initially
developed for linear time, given the applications of this paper we present them in their branching
time version. Given the model checking algorithms described later we summarise the formalism
below in relation to a branching time model. For more details we refer to [22].
Assume a set of possible local states Li for each agent i in a set A = {1, . . . , n} and a set Le of
possible local states for the environment e. The set of possible global states G ⊆ L1× · · · ×Ln×Le
is the set of all possible tuples (l1, . . . , ln, le) representing a snapshot of the system as a whole. The
model stipulates that each agent i performs one of the enabled actions in a given state according to
a protocol function Pi : Li → 2
Acti . Pi maps local states to sets of possible actions for agent i within
a repertoire of its actions Acti. Similarly, the environment e is assumed to be performing actions
following its protocol Pe : Le → 2
Acte . Joint actions (act1, . . . , actn, acte) are tuples of actions
performed jointly by all agents and the environment in accordance with their respective protocol.
Joint actions are used to determine the transition function T ⊆ G×Act1 × · · · ×Actn ×Acte ×G
which gives the evolution of a system from an initial global state g0 ∈ G. A path pi = (g0, g1, . . .) is
a maximal sequence of global states such that (gk, gk+1) ∈ T for each k ≥ 0 (if pi is finite then the
range of k is restricted accordingly). For a path pi = (g0, g1, . . .), we take pi(k) = gk. By Π(g) we
denote the set of all the paths starting at g ∈ G.
The model above can be enriched in several ways by expressing explicitly observation functions
for the agents in the system or by taking more concrete definitions of the sets of local states
thereby modelling specific classes of systems (perfect recall, no learning, etc.). We do not discuss
these options here; we simply note that in a later section we will pair this semantics with an
automata-based one.
To interpret the formulas of the language L for convenience we define models simply as tuples
M = (G, g0, T,∼1, . . . ,∼n, V ), where G is the set of the global states reachable from the initial
global state g0 via T ; ∼i ⊆ G × G is an epistemic relation for agent i defined by g ∼i g
′ iff
li(g) = li(g
′), where li : G → Li returns the local state of agent i given a global state; and
V : G × PV → {true, false} is an interpretation for the propositional variables PV in the
language.
The intuition behind the definition of models above is that the global states whose local com-
ponents are the same for agent i are not distinguishable for the agent in question. This definition
is standard in epistemic logics via interpreted systems—again we refer to [22] for more details.
We can use the model above to give a satisfaction relation |= for L inductively as standard. Let
M be a model, g = (l1, . . . , ln) a global state, and ϕ,ψ formulas in L:
• (M,g) |= p iff V (g, p) = true,
• (M,g) |= Kiϕ iff for all g
′ ∈ G if g ∼i g
′, then (M,g′) |= ϕ,
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• (M,g) |= DΓϕ iff for all i ∈ Γ and g
′ ∈ G if g ∼i g
′, then (M,g′) |= ϕ,
• (M,g) |= EΓϕ iff (M,g) |=
∧
i∈ΓKiϕ,
• (M,g) |= CΓϕ iff for all k ≥ 0 we have (M,g) |= E
k
Γϕ,
• (M,g) |= AXϕ iff for all pi ∈ Π(g) we have (M,pi(1)) |= ϕ,
• (M,g) |= AGϕ iff for all pi ∈ Π(g) and for all k ≥ 0 we have (M,pi(k)) |= ϕ,
• (M,g) |= A(ϕUψ) iff for all pi ∈ Π(g)) there exists a k ≥ 0 such that (M,pi(k)) |= ψ and for
all 0 ≤ j < k we have (M,pi(j)) |= ϕ.
The definitions for the Boolean connectives and the other inherited modalities are given as standard
and not repeated here. Ekϕ is to be understood as a shortcut for k occurrences of the E modality
followed by ϕ, i.e., E0ϕ = ϕ; E1ϕ = Eϕ; Ek+1ϕ = EEkϕ.
2.3 The dining cryptographers problem
The formalism of interpreted systems has been used successfully to model a variety of scenarios
ranging from basic communication protocols (e.g., the bit transmission problem, message passing
systems), to coordination (e.g., the attacking generals setting), deadlocks (e.g., the train-gate-
controller scenario), etc. We refer the reader to the specialised literature; the key consideration
here is that in each of these scenarios it is shown that temporal-epistemic languages can be used
to express specification for the systems and the individual agents very naturally.
To exemplify this we present a protocol for anonymous broadcast very well-known in the se-
curity literature: the dining cryptographers (DC). The DC was introduced by Chaum [14] and
analysed in a temporal-epistemic setting by Meyden and Su [48]. A reformulation to include cheat-
ing cryptographers (see Section 6) appears in [33]. We report the original wording here [14] (part
of this text was originally cited in [48]).
Three cryptographers are sitting down to dinner at their favorite three-star restaurant.
Their waiter informs them that arrangements have been made with the maitre d’hotel for
the bill to be paid anonymously. One of the cryptographers might be paying for dinner,
or it might have been NSA (U.S. National Security Agency). The three cryptographers
respect each other’s right to make an anonymous payment, but they wonder if NSA is
paying. They resolve their uncertainty fairly by carrying out the following protocol:
Each cryptographer flips an unbiased coin behind his menu, between him and the cryp-
tographer on his right, so that only the two of them can see the outcome. Each cryptog-
rapher then states aloud whether the two coins he can see–the one he flipped and the one
his left-hand neighbor flipped–fell on the same side or on different sides. If one of the
cryptographers is the payer, he states the opposite of what he sees. An odd number of
differences uttered at the table indicates that a cryptographer is paying; an even number
indicates that NSA is paying (assuming that dinner was paid for only once). Yet if a
cryptographer is paying, neither of the other two learns anything from the utterances
about which cryptographer it is.
Temporal-epistemic logic can be used to analyse the specification of the example—we summarise
here the description reported in [60, 56]. It is relatively straightforward to model the protocol above
by means of interpreted systems. For each agent i we can consider a local state consisting of the
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triple (l1i , l
2
i , l
3
i ), representing respectively whether the coins observed are the same or different,
whether agent i paid for the bill, and whether the announcements have an even or odd parity. A
local state for the environment can be taken as a 4-tuple (l1e , l
2
e , l
3
e , l
4
e) where l
1
e , l
2
e , l
3
e represent the
coin tosses for each agent and l4e represents whether or not the agent in question paid for the bill.
Actions and protocols for the agents and the environment can easily be given following Chaum’s
narrative description above and relations for the temporal evolution and the epistemic relation
easily built in this way.
In principle by coding the above we would be able to show on the model for DC that
(MDC , g
0) |=
∧
i∈A
(odd ∧ ¬paidi)→ AX(Ki(
∨
j 6=i
paidj)
∧
k 6=i
¬Kipaidk)
The specification above states that if an agent i observes an odd parity and did not cover the bill
then in all next states (i.e., when the announcements have been made) she will know that one of
the others paid for dinner but without knowing who it was.
Although conceptually easy, the example is already large enough to make it difficult to work
out all possible execution traces on the model. Of note is the fact that DC can actually be scaled
to any number of cryptographers. By using model checking techniques one can verify DC up to
8 and more cryptographers with resulting state spaces for the model of about 1036 states, and
considerably more cryptographers if the representation of the model is optimised [33].
Other examples are equally amenable to representation via interpreted systems and model
checking via the techniques presented below.
3 OBDD-based symbolic model checking
As it is customary in model checking in the following we analyse systems of finite states only. Given
a system S and a property P to be checked, the model checking approach suggests coding S as a
logical modelMS , the property P as a logic formula ϕP , and investigating whetherMS |= ϕP . In the
traditional approach the model MS is finite and represents all the possible computations of system
S and ϕP is a formula in temporal logic expressing some property to be checked on the system,
e.g., liveness, safety, etc. When ϕP is given in LTL or CTL checking ϕP on an explicitly given
MS is, of course, a very tractable problem. However it is impractical to represent MS explicitly, so
MS is normally implicitly given by means of a dedicated programming language using imperative
commands on sets of variables. This can be convenient for the programmer, but the number of
states in the resulting model grows exponentially with the number of variables used in the program
describing MS potentially causing great difficulty (state explosion problem).
Much of the model checking literature in plain temporal logic deals with techniques to limit the
impact of this, the most prominent being partial order reductions [52, 25], symmetry reductions [16,
20, 21], ordered-binary decision diagrams [12, 45], bounded and unbounded model checking [9, 46],
and (predicate) abstraction [18, 6]. By using partial-order reduction techniques the computational
tree MS is pruned and certain provably redundant states eliminated and/or collapsed with others
depending on the formula to be checked thereby reducing the state space. Symmetry reductions
are used to reducing the state spaces of distributed systems composed of many similar processes.
Predicate abstraction is based on the identification of certain predicates which have no impact on
the verification of the formula in question; crucially it is used in verification of infinite-state systems.
Binary-decision diagrams (described below) offer a compact representation for Boolean formulas
and traditionally constitute one of the leading symbolic approaches. Bounded and unbounded
model checking (described in Subsections 4.1 and 4.2 respectively) exploit recent advances in the
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efficiency of checking satisfiability for appropriate Boolean formulas suitably constructed. Several
tools have been developed for model checking temporal logic, including SPIN [30] for partial-order
reductions for LTL, SMV and NuSMV [45, 15] for binary-decision diagrams and bounded model
checking for LTL, and SLAM [7] for partial-ordered reductions for safety properties. Several other
tools exist for other varieties of temporal logic, e.g., real-time logics, probabilistic temporal logic,
and indeed other implementations are available for the same or slightly different techniques.
Even if all tools mentioned above are nowadays very sophisticated and support ad-hoc input
languages they are limited to temporal logics only. In the rest of the paper we discuss techniques
and tools supporting temporal-epistemic logics.
3.1 The ordered binary decision diagrams approach
The two main model checking platforms for temporal-epistemic logic based on binary-decision
diagrams are the MCK and the MCMAS toolkits. Both in their experimental phase, they implement
model checking of temporal-epistemic logic on interpreted systems semantics via ordered-binary
decision diagrams. MCK [23, 1] implements a variety of different semantics (observational, perfect
recall, etc), supports a concise and specialised input language, and was the first model checker
available supporting temporal-epistemic logic. MCMAS [57, 40] implements standard interpreted
systems semantics and a number of extensions, including deontic modalities, explicit knowledge,
ATL, etc. In terms of implementations the two tools are rather different. MCK is implemented
in Haskell using Long’s BDD library (written in C), whereas MCMAS is implemented in C++
and relies on Somenzi’s [62] BDD package (also in C). MCMAS and its theoretical background is
succinctly described in the rest of this section; we refer to [56] for an in-depth description.
Irrespective of the implementation details the angle when working on ordered-binary decision
diagrams (OBDDs) is the symbolic (OBDD-based) representation of sets and functions paired with
the observation that to work out whether (M,g) |= ϕ it is sufficient to evaluate whether or not
g ∈ SAT (ϕ) where SAT (ϕ) is the set of states in the modelM satisfying ϕ. To introduce the main
ideas of the approach we proceed in three stages: first, we observe we can code sets as Boolean
formulas; second, we show how OBDDs offer a compact representation to Boolean functions; third
we give algorithms for the calculation of SAT (ϕ).
First of all observe that given a set G of size |G| it is obvious how to associate uniquely a vector
of Boolean variables (w1, . . . , wm) to any element g ∈ G where m = ⌈log2|G|⌉. (Note that a tuple
of m places can represent 2m different elements). Any subset S ⊆ G can be represented by using
a characteristic function fS : (g1, . . . , gm) → {0, 1}, expressing whether the element (as encoded)
is in S or not. Note that functions and relations can also be encoded as Boolean functions; for
instance to encode that two states are related by some relation we can simply consider a vector
of Boolean functions comprising of two copies of the representation of the state to which we add
a further Boolean variable expressing whether or not the states are related. Vectors designed in
this way represent conjunctions of Boolean atoms or their negation and as such constitute a simple
(albeit possibly long) Boolean formula.
In the construction of OBDD-based model checking for plain temporal logic it is normally as-
sumed that the propositions themselves (appropriately ordered) constitute the basis for the encoding
of the states of the model. In the MCMAS approach Boolean functions first and then OBDDs are
constructed iteratively by considering all aspects of the interpreted system given. These involve
building the:
• Boolean functions for the sets of local, global states, actions, initial global states;
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Figure 1: A BDT for the Boolean function a ∨ (b ∧ c) (left) and its corresponding BDD (right).
The dotted lines correspond to assigning the value false to the atom whose name the edge leaves
from. Conversely solid lines represent assignments to true.
• Boolean functions representing the protocols for each agent, the local evaluation function for
each agent, the valuation for the atoms;
• Boolean functions representing the global temporal relation and the n epistemic relations
for the agents. The Boolean formula coding the temporal relation needs to encode that
joint actions correspond to enabled actions for all agents: fT (g, g
′) =
∨
a∈JointAct(g, a, g
′) ∈
T
∧
i∈A ai ∈ Pi(li(g)), where a = (a1, . . . , an) is a joint action for the system and all individual
action components ai are enabled by the local protocols at the corresponding local state li(g)
in g. The epistemic relations for the agents can be represented simply by imposing equality
on the corresponding local state component.
• A Boolean formula representing the set of reachable states for the interpreted system. This
can be encoded as standard by calculating the fix-point of the operator τ(Q) = (I(g) ∨
∃g′(T (g, a, g′) ∧Q(g′)).
Boolean functions are a convenient representation to perform certain logical operations on them
(e.g., ∧,∨); however it is well known that working out their satisfiability and validity can be
expensive. Truth tables themselves do not offer any advantage in this respect: for instance checking
satisfiability on them may involve checking 2n rows of the table where n is the number of atoms
present. OBDDs constitute a symbolic representation for Boolean functions and are normally much
cheaper to handle. Before introducing OBDDs observe that to every Boolean function we can
associate a binary decision tree (BDT), in which each level represents a different atom appearing in
the Boolean function. Taking a different path along the tree corresponds to selecting a particular
combination of values for the atoms (see Figure 1), thereby determining the truth value of the
formula.
In most instances a BDT is not an efficient representation of its corresponding Boolean function.
However, a series of operations can be performed on it to reduce it to a binary decision diagram
(BDD). A BDD is a directed acyclic graph with an initial node, and in which each node (representing
a Boolean atom) has two edges (corresponding to decision points true and false) originating from
it with the final leaves being either “true” or “false” (see Figure 1). There are several algorithms
for producing BDDs from BDTs; however the order of the operations on the initial BDT affects
the resulting BDD and, most crucially, comparing BDDs turns out to be an expensive operation.
What makes the whole approach useful is the provable assertion that there exist sets of algorithms
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computing canonical BDDs once the ordering of the variables is fixed. In other words, as long as
the ordering of the variables is fixed the resulting BDD is unique for a given Boolean function.
This is a remarkable result and leads to an alternative technique to compare Boolean functions:
compute their canonical BDDs; if they are the same they represent the same function, if not they
are the result of different functions. The canonical BDDs produced by this set of algorithms are
normally referred to as OBDDs and constitute one of the leading data structures in symbolic model
checking. We do not discuss algorithms to manipulate BDDs here and refer to [31] for details; but of
particular significance is the fact that Boolean operations on Boolean functions can be done directly
on the corresponding OBDDs without a very significant loss in performance. Other model-checking
specific set operations such as computing pre-images (see below) may also be coded in terms of the
corresponding BDDs. For more details on OBDDs and related techniques we refer to [31, Chapter
6] and references, notably [11].
We now present the algorithms for the calculation of the set of states SAT (ϕ) satisfying a
formula ϕ in L. In the OBDD approach all sets of states below are computed symbolically on the
corresponding OBDDs.
SAT (ϕ) {
ϕ is an atomic formula: return {g | V (g, ϕ) = true};
ϕ is ¬ϕ1: return S \ SAT (ϕ1);
ϕ is ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2: return SAT (ϕ1) ∩ SAT (ϕ2);
ϕ is EXϕ1: return SATEX(ϕ1);
ϕ is E(ϕ1Uϕ2): return SATEU (ϕ1, ϕ2);
ϕ is EFϕ1: return SATEF (ϕ1);
ϕ is Kiϕ1: return SATK(ϕ1, i);
ϕ is EΓϕ1: return SATE(ϕ1,Γ);
ϕ is DΓϕ1: return SATD(ϕ1,Γ);
ϕ is CΓϕ1: return SATC(ϕ1,Γ);
}
In the algorithm above, the auxiliary procedures SATEX , SATEU , SATEF follow the standard
algorithms used in temporal logic.2 For instance the set of global states satisfying EXϕ is computed
as follows (in what follows G is the set of reachable states).
SATEX(ϕ) {
X = SAT (ϕ);
Y = {g ∈ G | ∃g′ ∈ X and T (g, a, g′)}
return Y;
}
Note that the calculation of EX involves working out the pre-image of T . The set of states
satisfying the epistemic modalities are defined as follow (note that below we use ∼EΓ=
⋃
i∈Γ ∼i and
∼DΓ=
⋂
i∈Γ ∼i).
SATK(ϕ, i) {
X = SAT (¬ϕ);
Y = {g ∈ S | ∃g′ ∈ X and ∼i (g, g
′)}
return ¬Y;
}
SATE(ϕ,Γ) {
X = SAT (¬ϕ);
Y = {g ∈ G | ∼E
Γ
(g, g′) and g′ ∈ X}
return ¬Y;
}
2For efficiency reasons the CTL modalities implemented are typically EX, AF, and EU.
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Agent SampleAgent
Lstate = {s0,s1,s2};
Action = {a1,a2}
Protocol:
s0: {a1};
s1: {a2};
s2: {a1,a2};
end Protocol
Ev:
s1 if ((AnotherAgent.Action=a7);
s2 if Lstate=s1;
end Ev
end Agent
Figure 2: A fragment of ISPL code describing an agent.
SATD(ϕ,Γ) {
X = SAT (¬ϕ);
Y = {g ∈ G | ∼D
Γ
(g, g′) and g′ ∈ X}
return ¬Y;
}
SATC(ϕ,Γ) {
X = SAT (ϕ);
Y = G;
while ( X 6= Y ) {
X = Y;
Y = {g ∈ G | ∼E
Γ
(g, g′) and g′ ∈ Y and g′ ∈ SAT (ϕ)}
return Y;
}
The algorithm for Kiϕ is similar in spirit to the CTL algorithm for computing AXϕ: essentially
we compute the pre-image under the epistemic relation of the set of formulas not satisfying ϕ and
negate the result. EΓϕ (resp., DΓϕ) is done similarly but on the ∼
Γ
E (resp., ∼
Γ
D). For C we need to
use a fix-point construction (fix-point constructions already appear in the algorithm to compute the
satisfiability of the until operator). In fact, note that CΓϕ = EΓ(ϕ ∧ CΓϕ), so it can be computed
by calculating the fix-point of τ(Q) = SAT (EΓϕ ∧ Q) as in the table above. All sets operations
above are implemented on the corresponding OBDDs thereby producing the OBDD for SAT (ϕ).
We can then solve (M,g0) |= ϕ by answering the query g0 ∈ SAT (ϕ) on the corresponding OBDD.
3.2 MCMAS
MCMAS [40, 59] is a GNU GPL tool that implements the OBDD-based procedures of the previous
subsection. Input to the model checker is a program describing the evolutions of a multi-agent
system. The program is given in ISPL (Interpreted Systems Programming Language), a language
specialised for the specifications of interpreted systems and some extensions. An ISPL program
consists of a sequence of declarations for agents in the system, valuation for the atomic propositions,
and formulas in CTLK (other languages are also supported—see extensions). An agent is given by
explicitly listing the local states it may be in, the local actions, protocols, and the local evolution
function. Note that the local evolution function : Li × Act1 × · · · ×Actn → Li gives a set of rules
specifying the target local state when a certain combination of actions is performed. An example
of an ISPL fragment describing a very simple agent is given in Figure 2.
Upon invocation the tool parses the input, builds the OBDD for transition relation and the
OBDD for the set of reachable states. This is then used in the calculation of the OBDD for the sets
of states satisfying the formula to be verified. By comparing whether the initial state belongs to
ACM SIGACT News 10 Vol. —, No. —
this set the output is displayed. A graphical and a web interface are available for the tool. MCMAS
is presented in detail in [56].
4 SAT-based symbolic model checking
SAT-based model checking is the most recent symbolic approach for modal logic. It was motivated
by a dramatic increase in efficiency of SAT-solvers, i.e., algorithms solving the satisfiability problem
for propositional formulas [68]. The main idea of SAT-based methods consists in translating the
model checking problem for a temporal-epistemic logic to the problem of satisfiability of a formula in
propositional logic. This formula is typically obtained by combining an encoding of the model and
of the temporal-epistemic property. In principle, the approaches to SAT-based symbolic verification
can be viewed as bounded (BMC) or unbounded (UMC). BMC applies to an existential fragment
of a logic (here ECTLK) on a part of the model, whereas UMC is for an unrestricted logic (here
CTLK) on the whole model.
4.1 Bounded Model Checking
BMC was originally introduced for verification of LTL [9, 8] as an alternative to approaches based
on OBDDs. Then, BMC was defined for the existential fragment of the logic CTL [55] and then
extended to ECTLK [53]. BMC is based on the observation that some properties of a system
can be checked over a part of its model only. In the simplest case of reachability analysis, this
approach consists in an iterative encoding of a finite symbolic path as a propositional formula. The
satisfiability of the resulting propositional formula is then checked using an external SAT-solver.
We present here the main definitions of BMC for ECTLK and later discuss extensions to more
expressive logics. We refer the reader to the literature cited above for more details.
To explain how the model checking problem for an ECTLK formula is encoded as a proposi-
tional formula, we first define k-models, bounded semantics over k-models, and then propositional
encodings of k-paths in the k-model and propositional encodings of the formulas. In order to define
a bounded semantics for ECTLK we define k-models. LetM = (G, g0, T,∼1, . . . ,∼n,V) be a model
and k ∈ IN+. The k-model for M is defined as a structure Mk = (G, g
0, Pk,∼1, . . . ,∼n,V), where
Pk is the set of all the k-paths of M over G, where a k-path is the prefix of length k of a path.
We need to identify k-paths that represent infinite paths so that satisfaction of EG formulas
in the bounded semantics implies their satisfaction on the unbounded one. To this aim define the
function loop : Pk → 2
IN as: loop(pi) = {l | 0 ≤ l ≤ k and (pi(k), pi(l)) ∈ T}, which returns the
set of indices l of pi for which there is a transition from pi(k) to pi(l).
Let Mk be a k-model and α, β be ECTLK formulas. (Mk, g) |= α denotes that α is true at the
state g of Mk. The bounded semantics is summarised as follows. (Mk, g) |= EXα has the same
meaning as for unbounded models. (Mk, g) |= EGα states that there is a k-path pi, which starts at
g, all its states satisfy α and pi is a loop, which means that g is a T -successor of one of the states of
pi. The indexes of such states are given by loop(pi). For the other modalities the bounded semantics
is the same as unbounded, insisting on reachability of the state satisfying α on a path of length k.
Model checking over models can be reduced to model checking over k-models. The main idea
of BMC for ECTLK is that checking ϕ over Mk is replaced by checking the satisfiability of the
propositional formula [M,ϕ]k := [M
ϕ,g0 ]k ∧ [ϕ]Mk . [M
ϕ,g0 ]k represents (a part of) the model under
consideration whereas [ϕ]Mk captures a number of constraints that must be satisfied onMk for ϕ to
be satisfied. Checking satisfiability of an ECTLK formula can be done by means of a SAT-solver.
Typically, we start with k := 1, test satisfiability for the translation, and increase k by one until
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either [Mϕ,g
0
]k∧ [ϕ]Mk becomes satisfiable, or k reaches the maximal depth ofM , which is bounded
by |G|. It can be shown that if [Mϕ,g
0
]k ∧ [ϕ]Mk is satisfiable for some k, then (M,g
0) |= ϕ, where
M is the full unbounded model.
4.1.1 Translation to SAT
We provide here some details of the translation. The states and the transitions of the system under
consideration are encoded similarly as for BDDs in Section 3. Let w = (w[1], . . . , w[m]) be sequence
of propositions (called a global state variable) for encoding global states. A sequence w0,j, . . . , wk,j
of global state variables is called a symbolic k-path j. Since a model for a branching time formula
is a tree (a set of paths), we need to use a set of symbolic k-paths to encode it. The number of
them depends on the value of k and the formula ϕ, and it is computed using the function fk. This
function determines the number of k-paths sufficient for checking an ECTLK formula, see [67] for
more details. Intuitively, each nesting of an epistemic or temporal formula in ϕ increases the value
of fk(ϕ) by 1, whereas subformulas EU, EG and CΓ add more k-paths.
The propositional formula [Mϕ,g
0
]k, representing the k-paths in the k-model, is defined as
follows:
[Mϕ,g
0
]k := Ig0(w0,0) ∧
fk(ϕ)∧
j=1
k−1∧
i=0
T (wi,j, wi+1,j),
where w0,0 and wi,j for 0 ≤ i ≤ k and 1 ≤ j ≤ fk(ϕ) are global state variables, and T (wi,j, wi+1,j)
is a formula encoding the transition relation T .
An intuition behind this encoding is as follows. The vector w0,0 encodes the initial state g
0 and
for each symbolic k-path, numbered 1 . . . fk(ϕ), each pair of the consecutive vectors on this path
encodes pairs of states that are in the transition relation T . The formula T (w, v) is typically a
logical disjunction of the encodings of all the actions corresponding to the transitions of the model
M . This way, one symbolic k-path encodes all the (concrete) k-paths.
The next step of the algorithm consists in translating an ECTLK formula ϕ into a propositional
formula. Let w, v be global state variables. We make use of the following propositional formulas in
the encoding:
• p(w) encodes a proposition p of ECTLK over w.
• H(w, v) represents logical equivalence between global state encodings u and v (i.e., encodes
that u and v represent the same global states).
• HKi(w, v) represents logical equivalence between i-local state encodings u and v, (i.e., encodes
that u and v share i-local states).
• Lk,j(l) encodes a backward loop connecting the k-th state to the l-th state in the symbolic
k-path j, for 0 ≤ l ≤ k.
The translation of each ECTLK formula is directly based on its bounded semantics. The translation
of ϕ at the state wm,n into the propositional formula [ϕ]
[m,n]
k is as follows (we give the translation
of selected formulas only):
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[EXα]
[m,n]
k :=
∨fk(ϕ)
i=1
(
H(wm,n, w0,i) ∧ [α]
[1,i]
k
)
,
[EGα]
[m,n]
k :=
∨fk(ϕ)
i=1
(
H(wm,n, w0,i) ∧ (
∨k
l=0 Lk,i(l)) ∧
∧k
j=0[α]
[j,i]
k
)
,
[E(αUβ)]
[m,n]
k :=
∨fk(ϕ)
i=1
(
H(wm,n, w0,i) ∧
∨k
j=0
(
[β]
[j,i]
k ∧
∧j−1
t=0 [α]
[t,i]
k
))
,
[K lα]
[m,n]
k :=
∨fk(ϕ)
i=1
(
Ig0(w0,i) ∧
∨k
j=0
(
[α]
[j,i]
k ∧ HKl(wm,n, wj,i)
))
.
Intuitively, [EGα][m,n]k is translated to all the fk(ϕ)-symbolic k-paths (EGα is considered as a
subformula of ϕ) that start at the states encoded by wm,n, satisfy α, and are loops. [K lα]
[m,n]
k is
translated to all the fk(ϕ)-symbolic k-paths such that each symbolic k-path starts at the initial
state g0, one of its states satisfies α and shares the l-th state with these encoded by wm,n. Given
the translations above [67], verification of ϕ over Mk reduces to checking the satisfiability of the
propositional formula [Mϕ,g
0
]k ∧ [ϕ]Mk , where [ϕ]Mk = [ϕ]
[0,0]
k .
4.2 Unbounded Model Checking
UMC was originally introduced for verification of CTL [46] as an alternative to BMC and approaches
based on BDDs. Then, UMC was extended to CTLpK [35] as well as to other more expressive logics.
We begin by extending the syntax and semantics of CTLK to CTLpK by adding past operators
AY and AH. The operators including Since are omitted. A backward path pi = (g0, g1, . . .) is a
maximal sequence of global states such that (gk+1, gk) ∈ T for each k ≥ 0 (if pi is finite, then k
needs to be restricted accordingly). Let Π(g) denote the set of all the backward paths starting at
g ∈ G.
• (M,g) |= AYϕ iff for all pi ∈ Π(g) we have (M,pi(1)) |= ϕ,
• (M,g) |= AHϕ iff for all pi ∈ Π(g) and for all k ≥ 0 we have (M,pi(k)) |= ϕ.
Unlike BMC, UMC is capable of handling the whole language of the logic. Our aim is to translate
CTLpK formulas into propositional formulas in conjunctive normal form, accepted as an input by
SAT-solvers.
Specifically, for a given CTLpK formula ϕ, a corresponding propositional formula [ϕ](w) is
computed, where w is a global state variable (i.e., a vector of propositional variables for representing
global states) encoding these states of the model where ϕ holds. The translation is not operating
directly on temporal-epistemic formulas. Instead, to calculate propositional formulas either the
QBF or the fix-point characterisation of CTLpK formulas (see Section 3) is used. More specifically,
three basic algorithms are exploited. The first one, implemented by the procedure forall [46], is
used for translating formulas Øα such that Ø ∈ {AX, AY, Ki, DΓ, EΓ}. This procedure eliminates
the universal quantifiers from a QBF formula characterising a CTLpK formula, and returns the
result in a conjunctive normal form. The second algorithm, implemented by the procedure gfpO
is applied to formulas Øα such that Ø ∈ {AG,AH, CΓ}. This procedure computes the greatest
fix-point, in the standard way, using Boolean representations of sets rather than sets themselves.
For formulas of the form A(αUβ) the third procedure, called lfpAU , computing the least fix-point
(in a similar way), is used. In so doing, given a formula ϕ a propositional formula [ϕ](w) is obtained
such that ϕ is valid in the model M iff the propositional formula [ϕ](w) ∧ Ig0(w) is satisfiable.
The reader is referred to [34] for more details, especially on computing fix-points over proposi-
tional representations of sets. In the following section we show how to represent CTLpK formulas
in QBF and then translate them to propositional formulas in CNF.
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4.2.1 From a fragment of QBF to CNF
Quantified Boolean Formulas (QBF) are an extension of propositional logic by means of quantifiers
ranging over propositions. The BNF syntax of a QBF formula is given by:
α ::= p | ¬α | α ∧ α | ∃p.α | ∀p.α.
The semantics of the quantifiers is defined as follows:
• ∃p.α iff α(p← true) ∨ α(p← false),
• ∀p.α iff α(p← true) ∧ α(p← false),
where α ∈ QBF, p ∈ PV and α(p← q) denotes substitution with the variable q of every occurrence
of the variable p in formula α. For example, the formula [AXα](w) is equivalent to the formula
∀v.(T (w, v)⇒ [α](v)) in QBF. Similar equivalences are obtained for the formulas AYα, Kiα, DΓα,
and EΓα by replacing T (w, v) with suitable encodings of the relations T
−1, ∼i, ∼
D
Γ , and ∼
E
Γ .
For defining a translation from a fragment of QBF (resulting from the translation of CTLpK)
to propositional logic, one needs to know how to compute a CNF formula which is equivalent to
a given propositional formula ϕ. While the standard algorithm toCNF [46, 54], which transforms
a propositional formula to one in CNF, preserving satisfiability only, is of linear complexity, a
translation to an equivalent formula is NP-complete. For such a translation, one can use the
algorithm equCNF - a version of the algorithm toCNF , known as a cube reduction. We refer the
reader to [13, 24], where alternative solutions can be found. The algorithm equCNF is a slight
modification of the DPLL algorithm checking satisfiability of a CNF formula (see [54]), but it can
be presented in a general way, abstracting away from its specific realisation.
Assume that ϕ is an input formula. Initially, the algorithm equCNF builds a satisfying assign-
ment for the formula toCNF (ϕ)∧¬lϕ (lϕ is a literal used in toCNF (ϕ)), i.e., the assignment which
falsifies ϕ. If one is found, instead of terminating, the algorithm constructs a new clause that is
in conflict with the current assignment (i.e., it rules out the satisfying assignment). Each time a
satisfying assignment is obtained, a blocking clause is generated by a procedure blocking clause
and added to the working set of clauses. This clause rules out a set of cases where ϕ is false.
Thus, on termination, when there is no satisfying assignment for the current set of clauses, the
conjunction of the blocking clauses generated precisely characterises ϕ.
A blocking clause could in principle be generated using the conflict-based learning procedure.
If we require a blocking clause to contain only input variables, i.e., literals used in ϕ, then one
could either use an (alternative) implication graph [46] in which all the roots are input literals
or a method introduced by Szreter [64, 63], which consists in searching a directed acyclic graph
representing the formula.
Our aim is to compute a propositional formula equivalent to a given QBF formula ∀p1 . . . ∀pn.ϕ.
The algorithm constructs a formula ψ equivalent to ϕ and eliminates from ψ the quantified variables
on-the-fly, which is correct as ψ is in CNF. The algorithm differs from equCNF in one step only,
where the procedure blocking clause generates a blocking clause and deprives it of the quantified
propositional variables. On termination, the resulting formula is a conjunction of the blocking
clauses without the quantified propositions and precisely characterises ∀p1 . . . ∀pn.ϕ (see [34, 54]
for more details).
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4.3 VerICS
VerICS [19, 49] is a verification tool for real-time systems (RTS) and multi-agent systems (MAS).
It offers three complementary methods of model checking: SAT-based Bounded Model Checking
(BMC), SAT-based Unbounded Model Checking (UMC), and an on-the-fly verification while con-
structing abstract models of systems. The theoretical background for its implementation has been
presented elsewhere [54, 55].
A network of communicating (timed) automata (together with a valuation function) is the basic
VerICS’s formalism for modelling a system to be verified. Timed automata are used to specify RTS,
whereas timed or untimed automata are applied to model MAS. VerICS translates a network of
automata and a temporal-epistemic formula into a propositional formula in CNF and invokes a
SAT-solver in order to check for its satisfiability.
Currently, VerICS implements BMC for ECTLKD (ECTLK extended with deontic operators)
and TECTLK (see Section 5), and UMC for CTLpK. VerICS has been implemented in C++; its
internal functionalities are available via an interface written in Java [2].
5 Extensions to real-time epistemic logic
In this section we briefly discuss some extensions to real-time to the ECTLK framework analysed
so far. The timed temporal-epistemic logic TECTLK [44] was introduced to deal with situation
where time is best assumed to be dense and hence modelled by real numbers. The underlying
semantics uses networks of timed automata [4] to specify the behaviour of the agents. These
automata extend standard finite state automata by a set of clocks X (to measure the flow of time)
and time constrains built over X that can be used for defining guards on the transitions as well
invariants on their locations. When moving from a state to another, a timed automaton can either
execute action transitions constrained by guards and invariants, or time transitions constrained
by invariants only. Crucial for automated verification of timed automata is the definition of an
equivalence relation ≡ ⊆ IR|X |× IR|X | on clocks valuations, which identifies two valuations v and v′
in which either all the clocks exceed some value cmax,
3 or two clocks x and y with the same integer
part in v and v′ and either their fractional parts are equal to 0, or are ordered in the same way, i.e.,
fractional (v(x)) ≤ fractional (v(y)) iff fractional (v′(x)) ≤ fractional (v′(y)). The equivalence classes
of ≡ are called zones. Since ≡ is of finite index, there is only finitely many zones for each timed
automaton.
In addition to the standard epistemic operators, the language of TECTLK contains the temporal
operators EG and EU combined with time intervals I on reals in order to specify when precisely
formulas are supposed to hold. Note that TECTLK does not include the next step operator EX as
this operator is meaningless on dense time models. The formal syntax of TECTLK in BNF is as
follows:
ϕ,ψ ::= p ∈ PV | ¬p | ψ ∧ ϕ | ψ ∨ ϕ | Kiϕ | EΓϕ | DΓϕ | CΓϕ | EGIϕ | E(ϕUIψ)
A (real time interpreted) model for TECTLK over a timed automaton is defined as a tuple M =
(Q, s0, T,∼1, . . . ,∼n, V ), where Q is the subset of G × IR
|X | such that G is the set of locations of
the timed automaton, all the states in Q are reachable from s0 = (g0, v0) with g0 being the initial
location of the timed automaton and v0 the valuation in which all the clocks are equal to 0; T is
defined by the action and timed transitions of the timed automaton, ∼i ⊆ Q × Q is an epistemic
3This constant is computed from a timed automaton and a formula to be verified.
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relation for agent i defined by (g, v) ∼i (g
′, v) iff g ∼i g
′ and v ≡ v′; and V : Q×PV → {true, false}
is a valuation function for PV . Intuitively, in the above model two states are in the epistemic
relation for agent i if their locations are in this relation according to the standard definition in
Section 2 and their clocks valuations belong to the same zone.
In what follows, we give the semantics of E(ϕUIψ) and EGIϕ of TECTLK and discuss how
BMC is applied to this logic. Differently from the paths of temporal-epistemic models, the paths in
real time models consist of action transitions interleaved with timed transitions. The time distance
to a state s from the initial one at a given path can be computed by adding the times of all the timed
transitions that has occurred up to this state. Following this intuition the semantics is formulated
as follows:
• (M,s) |= E(ϕUIψ) iff there is a path inM starting at s which contains a state where ψ holds,
reached from s within the time distance of I, and ϕ holds at all the earlier states,
• (M,s) |= EGIϕ iff there is a path in M starting at s such that ϕ holds at all the states within
the time distance of I.
The idea of BMC for (M,s0) |= ϕ, where ϕ is TECTLK formula, is based on two translations and
on the application of BMC for ECTLK. An infinite real time model M is translated to a finite
epistemic modelMd and each formula ϕ of TECTLK is translated to the formula cr(ϕ) of the logic
ECTLKy , which is a slight modification of ECTLK. The above two translations guarantee that
(M,s0) |= ϕ iff (Md, s
0) |= cr(ϕ).
Assume we are given a timed automaton A and a TECTLK formula ϕ. We begin by translating
the real time model M (for A) to Md. First, the automaton A is extended with one special clock y,
an action ay, and the set of transitions Ey going from each location to itself and resetting the clock
y. These transitions are used to start the paths over which sub-formulas of ϕ are checked. Then,
the finite model Md for the extended timed automaton is built. The model Md = (Qd, q
0, Td,∼
d
1
, . . . ,∼dn,Vd), where Qd is a suitably selected (via discretization) finite subset of Q, the relations
Td,∼
d
i are suitably defined restrictions of the corresponding relations in M , and Vd = V|Qd.
The above translation cr of the temporal modalities is non-trivial only. Applying cr to E(αUIβ)
we get the formula EXyE(cr(α)Ucr((β) ∧ p)), where the operator EXy is interpreted over the
transitions corresponding to the action ay, and p is a propositional formula characterising zones.
A similar translation applies to EGIα.
After the above two translations have been defined, the model checking of a TECTLK formula
ϕ over M is reduced to model checking of cr(ϕ) over Md, for which BMC can be used as presented
in Section 4.1.
5.1 Example
To exemplify the expressive power of TECTLK we specify a correctness property for an extension
of the Railroad Crossing System (RCS) [36], a well-known example in the literature of real time
verification. Below, we summarise the description from [44].
The system consists of three agents: Train, Gate, and Controller running in parallel and syn-
chronising through the events: approach, exit, lower and raise. When a train approaches the
crossing, Train sends the signal approach to Controller and enters the crossing between 300 and
500 milliseconds (ms) from this event. When Train leaves the crossing, it sends the signal exit to
Controller. Controller sends the signal lower to Gate exactly 100ms after the signal approach is
received, and sends the signal raise signal within 100ms after exit. Gate performs the transition
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down within 100ms of receiving the request lower, and responds to raise by moving up between
100ms and 200ms.
Consider the following correctness property: there exists a behaviour of RCS such that agent
Train considers possible a situation in which it sends the signal approach but agent Gate does not
send the signal down within 50 ms. This property can be formalised by the following TECTLK
formula:
ϕ = EF[0,∞]KTrain(approach ∧ EF[0,50](¬down)).
By using BMC techniques we can verify the above property for RCS.
6 Related Work
The approaches above have been extended in several directions and other articles have appeared
pursuing related lines. It was mentioned in Section 3 that van der Meyden and colleagues were the
first to propose concretely how OBDDs could be used to model check temporal-epistemic logic as
well as to study the complexity of the model checking problem in specific cases [47] ([39] has further
results on this). As discussed above the main difference of their approach to the one presented here
is the different semantics employed and the particular optimisation techniques used on it. We refer
to [23, 1] for more details. We are not aware of other symbolic efforts other than the one presented
above as far as SAT-based techniques (BMC, UMC) are concerned. However, different techniques
for temporal-epistemic logic have been put forward in the past.
In [29] van der Hoek andWooldridge suggested reduction of temporal-epistemic logic to temporal
logic only by using local propositions fully describing agents’ local states. The approach consists
in manually finding appropriate propositions describing appropriate states. An example of the
technique is described on an example in [65] where the ATL model checker MOCHA [3] is used
(see also below). Lastly, temporal-epistemic logic on discrete time was recently recast as a special
case of ARCTL [51]. An extension of NuSMV was introduced to implement ARCTL [51] thereby
enabling the verification of CTLK directly on NuSMV via an ad-hoc translation as discussed in
[38].
Model checking has also been investigated for certain extensions of the temporal-epistemic
logics discussed here. In [58] an OBDD-based approach to the verification of deontic interpreted
systems [42] is presented and in [67] the BMC case was analysed. Deontic interpreted systems are
a formalism enabling the representation and the distinction of correct versus incorrect states of
agents. In this framework local states are partitioned into correct and incorrect local states and
a modality Oi introduced for every agent evaluating formulas only at the correct states thereby
representing concepts such as “all the correct states for agent i”. For instance, one could analyse a
variant of the dining cryptographers scenario where some cryptographers are intruders saying the
opposite of what they should [33]. Extensions to epistemic logic to include explicit knowledge have
also been discussed and implemented [43, 41]. Both VerICS and MCMAS support these formalisms.
In other developments model checking of epistemic logic in an ATL [5] setting has also been
pursued. ATL can be shown to extend CTL (at some computational cost) by adding strategies
in the semantics and explicit representation of the notion of enforcement in the syntax. Even if
strategies and knowledge can interact in rather subtle ways [32], progress has been made both in
the definition of ATL extensions including knowledge and other modalities and in their verification.
We refer to [66] for an up-to-date survey and references. The approach taken there uses MOCHA [3]
and the local propositions construction referenced above. MCMAS described earlier in this survey
also supports ATL natively in the different knowledge semantics proposed. We do not discuss the
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syntax here and refer to above mentioned references for more details.
Elsewhere epistemic-like concepts have been used in a broader context to reason about multi-
agent systems modelled by other attitudes (such as norms, beliefs, desires, or intentions). Normally
these properties are treated simply as propositions in a temporal language and not as prima-specie
citizens like the epistemic modalities above, consequently the approaches are rather different and
not discussed here.
7 Conclusions
It has long been argued that epistemic logic provides an intuitive formalism in a variety of key
areas in computer science. In this article we have surveyed some of the recent contributions to
solving the model checking problem for temporal-epistemic logic in a branching time setting under
a discrete and a continuous model of time. The conclusion we can draw from the above is that
model checking temporal-epistemic logic is very often no harder than plain temporal logic; however
most procedures and particular algorithms need to be extended to accommodate this need. Now
that model checking algorithms and tools have been made available it will be interesting to see the
extent to which temporal-epistemic logic can be used in real-life scenarios.
Note. The techniques described in Sections 3–5 were joint work of the authors with M. Kacprzak,
F. Raimondi, and B. Woz´na.
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